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A R T I C L E S  
THE AMBITIONS OF POLICY DESIGN 
John S. Dryzek and Brian Ripley 
Public policy is concerned with solving or ameliorating social problems. 
Public policy design involves conscious invention, development, and applica- 
tion of patterns of action in problem resolution. Contemporary perceptions 
of widespread (if not wholesale) failure in purposive public policy should 
warn us tha t  would-be policy designers face no easy task. Certainly, there 
has been no shortage of cautions against excessive ambition in consciously- 
pursued public policy. Our contention is that  these critics have missed the 
target. Based on a correction of their aim, we will suggest there is little 
reason to  eschew ambition in policy design, provided only that  one attends 
closely to  the  conditions of policy formation. This is not to  say that  ambi- 
tion should be pursued for its own sake, or that  it is always appropriate, 
merely that  fear of ambition should not act as  a constraint. We warn the 
reader in advance that  our survey of the critics is brief, in order to provide 
space for fuller articulation of our own position. 
WARNINGS AGAINST EXCESSIVE AMBITION 
A first warning against excess would have policy designers bridle their 
ambitions due to the inadequacy of weak social science theory. Effective 
policy design requires a theoretical base. The more ambitious the design, 
the greater the demands on social science theory. The trouble is that  so- 
cial science knowledge is dispersed, incomplete, and frequently contradic- 
tory. Policy design based on such theories is clearly a risky business. 
In this idiom, the more prominent critics of over-ambitious policy design 
include Popper (1966, 1972) and von Hayek (1944). Von Hayek (1978) ar- 
gues that  "scientistic" movement from theoretical abstraction to practical 
application loses sight of the weakness of the theory on which any design 
is based. 
Both Popper and von Hayek warn against utopian planners informed by 
comprehensive, highly abstract theories. Such visionary blueprints call for 
radical "canvas cleaning," which translates into the destruction of existing 
tainted social institutions. Thus the way is paved to authoritarian rule, for 
any theory for reconstruction is going to be mistaken, tempting its guar- 
dians into coercion of an apparently recalcitrant reality. Both these 
authors and their followers direct their arguments against policy based on 
any social theory assumed to be t rue and beyond criticism, whether i t  per- 
tains to the  construction of urban highways or an ideal state (see James, 
1980). 
Skepticism about the ability of social science theory to inform policy is 
frequently (if not necessarily) coupled with a more general distrust of public 
bureaucracies and their component officials, which constitutes a second 
warning. There is no need to posit motivations of greed, malice (von Hayek, 
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1944), or low self-esteem (Lasswell, 1930) on the  part  of public officials in 
ordcr to doubt t he  efficacy of public institutions. Ordinary self-interest will 
suffice. Economistic critics of public decision making such as Friedman and 
Fricdman (1980) assume tha t  bureaucrats are  as rationally self-interested 
as anyone else in society. Thus a sizeable public choice l i terature predicts 
public organizations will t ry  to  expand their  size and budget to the  exclusion 
of all other concerns (see, for example, Niskanen, 1971). 
A thi rd  barr ier  t o  ambitious policy design s tems from the  political 
divisions inherent in plural societies, which can rarely achieve a durable 
political coalition to  support any particular social remodelling (at  least out- 
side extraordinary circumstances such as depression and war). The  prospect 
here is  tha t  exasperated planners may be tempted by the  maxim tha t  
d e s p e r a t e  t i m e s  cal l  fo r  d e s p e r a t e  m e a s u r e s .  T h u s  t h e  r i s e  of 
authoritarianism in Latin America has often been linked to ambitious 
economic stabilization policies (Collier, 1979). More generally, over-am- 
bitious policy design can create a situation where programs are  created on 
behalf of citizens, but  not at their  behest. Dissent can expect t he  whip of 
a cruel s ta te  apparatus. 
ANTIDOTES TO EXCESSIVE AMBITION 
The discussion of the  previous section is ample warrant for modesty in 
policy design. However, there  are  several antidotes t o  the  dangers of ex- 
cessive ambition, each of which requires i ts  own distinctive kind of con- 
scious policy design. 
Perhaps the  most well-known such antidote, especially in the  context of 
weak social science theory, is  incrementalism. A thinking person's in- 
c rementa l i sm i s  forcefully a r t icu la ted  i n  Popper 's  (1972) not ion of 
"piecemeal social engineering," and developed into a methodology of sys- 
tcmatic trial and test  in public policy by Popperians such as  Campbell 
(1969). In  th i s  light, any public policy design should simultaneously 
ameliorate a social problem and yield clear inferences about t he  veracity of 
the  theory informing the  policy. If the  theory is corroborated, then policies 
based upon it  should be adopted somewhat more extensively; if tha t  theory 
is falsified, then alternative directions for policy should be sought. It is  cru- 
cial, at  least in Popper's own formulation, tha t  maximal opportunity be 
provided f o r  criticism of t he  policy, t he  theory on which i t  is  based, and its 
effects. Criticism should be admissible from all quarters, both expert and 
lay, for policies based on weak theories inevitably produce unanticipated ef- 
fects in surprising locations (see James, 1980). 
A strategy of incrementalism or piecemeal social engineering does little 
to offset t he  second warning, pertaining to the  self-interest of politicians 
and bureaucrats. Moreover, if large administrative systems are  too cum- 
bersome to pursue any conception of the  public interest  systematically and 
effectively, there  is  little reason to  expect the  sensitivity, critical spirit, and 
flexibility necessary for successful experimentation. 
Two options present themselves here. The first, in vogue for a decade 
now, involves privatization and minimization of t he  scope of government 
(see, for example, Friedman & Friedman, 1962,1984). If we cannot do away 
with government ,  a second option is available: make government as  
decentralized as  possible. A perennial theme in the  public choice l i terature 
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would have governmental jurisdictions as  small and specialized as possible, 
on the  grounds tha t  public officials are  visible and accountable to  the  ex- 
tent  they produce a limited range of services for a small number of people 
(see, for example, Bish, 1978; Ostrom, 1971). 
The  last  obstacle to  ambition we noted in the  previous section, tha t  of 
political conflict, can be approached in a t  least three ways. First, though 
classical liberals believe consensus on the  features of an ideal society is im- 
possible, a t  least one strand in contemporary liberalism believes consensus 
is attainable with respect to the  content of t he  worst ills afflicting society. 
Like the  lawmen of the  Old West, public policy should try to  "clean up the  
town." More formally, this stance is known as "negative utilitarianism" (see 
O'Hear, 1980, pp. 157-158), which restricts public policy to pursuit of the  
elements of utility functions presumed held in common by all (or at least 
most) members of society. Such common elements might include eradica- 
tion of extreme poverty or bringing down the  inflation rate.  
A second, superficially similar, means for coping with descensus in public 
policy is provided by the  "politics of prevention" associated with Harold 
Lasswell (1965). But Lasswell is  less concerned with ameliorating existing 
social problems t h a n  with ant ic ipat ing and  prevent ing fu tu re  ones. 
Lasswell argues for  t he  articulation of "developmental constructs," projec- 
tions of likely but  unwanted future s ta tes  of affairs (e.g., a militarized "gar- 
rison state"), about which consensus should be possible. Such constructs 
should function as  self-denying prophecies by stimulating policies to  
prevent their  actualization. 
A third, perhaps more nebulous, approach to descensus would simply 
recognize i ts  inevitability and, therefore, designers should seek the  iden- 
tification of any minimal policies around which a broad coalition could be 
mobilized or broad acquiescence obtained. On the  other hand, t he  politi- 
cally astute policy designer may be able to capitalize on problem complexity 
in order to  a t  least partially overcome descensus. One way of apprehend- 
ing complex problems is through their  decomposition into a set  of smaller, 
interconnected problems, each with a potential solution.' Along these 
lines, Hirschman (1973) advises "reformmongers" to entice disparate politi- 
cal groups into problem-solving efforts by framing the  issues involved in 
parochial terms attractive to  each of the  respective audiences. Having co- 
opted these diverse groups, t he  skilled reformmonger can nudge them 
toward fur ther  contribution. Each political group feels i t  has obtained a 
victory, some progress is  made in resolving a searing social problem, and 
the  shrewd policy designer's agenda is furthered. 
WHY THE ANTIDOTES FAIL 
The critics of excessive ambition in policy design would seem, then,  t o  
have made a number of remedies available, all of which salvage the  pos- 
sibility of design, if in modified form. We will argue in this section tha t  
these measures generally fail to  serve as  t he  remedies envisioned by their  
proponents. 
First of all, t he  purported virtues of incrementalism are  undermined 
upon closer examination of i ts  central concept. While Dempster and Wil- 
davsky (1979) tell us  "there is  no magic size for an increment," t he  problem 
here is less t he  lack of any scale by which to  measure size than i t  is t he  
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demands on theory, dismissed by incrementalists as weak and unreliable, 
to help us  distinguish incremental from non-incremental adjustments. An 
intervention may turn out to  be too big, and prove the first step on a slip- 
pery slope from which there is no escape (see Goodin & Waldner, 1979, p. 
4). For example, deciding to  construct a short stretch of freeway may effec- 
tively commit a government to a larger network of freeways in order to 
eliminate the congestion on roads leading to the  first stretch. On the  other 
hand, an intervention may prove too small to either make any difference to 
its target or yield any inferences about the theory on which i t  is based. 
Schulman (1980) notes that  projects like the NASA space program require 
large commitments of resources if they are to produce any results a t  all. 
Aside from being unable to  tell us much about the  actual size of an incre- 
ment, weak theory cannot tell us how to construct an experiment for test- 
ing itself, especially with respect to  the  influences tha t  need to  be 
controlled (see Goodin & Waldner, 1979, pp. 13-16). Nor can weak theory 
indicate how long we should wait before adjudging an experiment a success 
or a failure. Design strategies involving privatization and a concomitant ex- 
panded role for market allocation hardly constitute a panacea for the ills of 
policy. Galbraith (1967) and others have long warned that  large private in- 
stitutions are  subject to the same behavior and the same problems as large 
public institutions. Moreover, i t  is abundantly clear that market systems 
are unable to supply the values economists call public goods, a t  least to the 
degree such systems are  competitive and decentralized. T o  the extent they 
are oligopolistic and centralized then the ills of large-scale organization ap- 
pear. 
Both market and piecemeal social reform are  planks in the classical 
liberal platform, articulated forcefully by Popper and von Hayek. There is 
a clear inconsistency here. While Popper and von Hayek both stress the 
limitations of any theory of society, a belief in the  power of the market rests 
on just such a theory--and a fairly comprehensive, macrolevel one to boot. 
Of course, not all market advocates share the caution of Popper and von 
Hayek. Some see market theory as  strong enough to use as  a base for radi- 
cal reconstruction (see, for example, Friedman & Friedman, 1984). These 
bolder classical liberals suffer an inconsistency of their own, though, for i t  
will require drastic, purposeful, but unmistakably governmental action to 
bring their utopia into being. But governments, they tell us, inevitably go 
astray in their actions. One of the few escapes here seems to be the one ad- 
vocated by Friedman and Friedman (1984): a grassroots mass movement to 
shrink government, headed ideally by a charismatic leader. One suspects 
tha t  the use of such totalitarian means to  lead society toward a market sys- 
tem is as risky as asking a Leninist Communist party to preside over the 
withering away of the state. 
Governmental  decentral izat ion proves no more compelling than  
privatization as a means for promoting efficiency. The counter argument 
to the  public choice decentralizers is of course that  economies of scale can 
make large organizations more efficient than smaller ones, which in turn 
suggests consolidation of governmental units. When two theories predi- 
cated upon different assumptions predict opposite results, then clearly an 
appeal to empirical evidence is necessary. The available evidence is equivo- 
cal (see Lovrich & Neiman, 1984, for a survey). 
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Turning now from "positive " utilitarian market and public choice advo- 
cates to "negative" utilitarian problem solvers, it is clear that  their requisi- 
te  unproblematic consensus on what constitutes the worst ills in society is 
rare. Even when such a coalition can be patched together it may prove 
short-lived. Consider, for example, the fate of New Deal liberalism (Reich, 
1985). The twin perils of economic collapse and global war forged a consen- 
sus built on a spirit of solidarity through shared sacrifice. Postwar af- 
fluence allowed expansion of social welfare programs without  any 
immediate or obvious costs to groups within the coalition. The economic 
ills of the 1970s exposed the underlying fissures, and the lack of a coherent 
unifying philosophy left the coalition open to collapse. 
Moreover, even if the requisite coalition and consensus is conceivable, i t  
is by no means obvious that  policy designers should await their arrival 
before proceeding. Take the history of the civil rights movement in the 
United States. One would presume that  a social evil such as massive racial 
discrimination would engender the rational consensus negative utilitarians 
predict. But when the issue of civil rights finally did reach prominence 
during the 1960s, there  was no immediate consensus on the  nature of the 
problem. Riots and heightened racial tension were symptomatic of a lack of 
agreement, but they certainly did not suggest inaction pending consensus. 
In fact, most policy debate results from competing definitions of "searing 
social problems." There turns out to be little difference between negative 
and positive utilitarianism on this score. 
One further distinction that  loses its power upon closer examination is 
between avoiding dystopia and pursuing utopia. For example, von Hayek's 
(1944) Road to  Ser fdom explicitly warns against an authoritarian dystopia 
and implicitly describes a market utopia. Just  as people disagree about 
utopia, so can they differ over dystopia. Any strenuous avoidance of dystopia 
can involve coercion and repression of individuals who demur. Consider, for 
example, some of the  implications of the British government's efforts to 
avert "serfdom" since 1979. In that  period Britain has gained a de fucto na- 
tionally-organized police force constructed to confront organized trade 
unions. Trade union activities have been further restricted by governmen- 
tal prohibitions against sympathy strikes and secondary picketing. 
The remaining means for coping with descensus discussed in the  pre- 
vious section is the minimalist strategy. This approach has all the  familiar 
defects of "muddling through" when i t  comes to circumstances of severe 
policy problems, rapid social change, and changing social values (see, for ex- 
ample, Dror, 1964). Martin Luther King's eloquent "Letter from Birmin- 
gham Jail" offers a stinging critique of white moderates who repeatedly 
urge blacks to  be patient and cautious in their reform efforts. Willingness 
to  accept slow, gradual reform may in fact prove to be a direct function of 
one's place in society rather than a commitment to risk-aversion in public 
policy. Hirschman's a t tempts  to  accelerate and direct "muddling" by 
manipulation on the part of the policy designer is perilous, inasmuch as i t  
relies on trickery. One suspects that  if this trickery were exposed then the 
designer would indeed achieve a social consensus, one solidly against his or 
her agenda. If such a fate is to be avoided then the policy designer needs 
synoptic vision and consummate political skills, which hardly constitute an 
antidote to excessive ambition. 
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RE-CASTING THE DISTINCTIONS 
The more widely-prescribed antidotes to excessive ambition in policy 
design turn out to be placebos, effectively obscuring the spread of the dis- 
eases they purportedly cure. But we have still to determine the appropriate 
ambitions of policy design, or, more precisely, the conditions under which 
we can confidently engage in what kinds of policy design. 
Our approach to this determination rests on a claim that  the principal 
detractors of excess in policy design have erred in the distinctions they 
make, and hence have all hit the  wrong target. After substantiating this 
claim and correcting their aim, w e  will develop some distinctions of our own, 
and thereby generate some guidelines as to when policy design may be 
embraced and when avoided. 
Consider, first, the  misplaced distinctions of piecemeal social engineers 
and  i n c r e m e n t a l i s t s  we ou t l ined  above. T h e  i r r e l evance  of t h e  
piecemeal/holistic distinction should draw attention to  the other, more con- 
vincing, plank in the Popperian policy platform: the need for maximal 
criticism of policy proposals and effects. 
Turning now to laissez-faire critics of large public organizations, let us 
suggest they redirect their ire a t  hierarchy rather than size or publicness. 
For private organizations are quite capable of malfunctioning, and small 
governmental units are not immune to subversion of their ends by self-in- 
terested officials. As we have already noted, the limited available empiri- 
cal evidence suggests tha t  small size is not necessarily correlated with 
effectiveness or accountability.2 On the other hand, a substantial litera- 
ture on organizational and administrative structure points to the informa- 
tional problem-solving pathologies of hierarchical systems (see, for 
example, Lindblom, 1977; Thayer, 1981). In a nutshell, hierarchy can 
obstruct the  free dissemination of information, conjecture, and criticism es- 
sential to effective problem-solving. The incentives are  such that  in- 
dividuals use information as a resource in intraorganizational struggles 
rather than as an aid to  joint problem solving (see Wilensky, 1967). Those 
at  higher levels use their privileged command of information to solidify 
claims to authority. For their part, subordinates release and slant informa- 
tion in a manner designed to put a positive gloss on their performance. 
Hierarchical systems may be adequate for routine decision making and 
simple tasks, but not problem solving in a complex and variable environ- 
ment (see Inbar, 1979). While hierarchy may be more likely in large or- 
ganizations, size itself is no guarantee; nor will small scale necessarily 
dispense with hierarchy. 
Finally, consider again pluralist warnings against excessive ambition in 
policy design. Surely, the key distinction here is not between boldness and 
modesty, for imposed modest reforms--be they designs or policies--can ex- 
pect a similar fate in plural society. Rather, it is the fact of imposition that  
tempts failure, hence the  relevant distinction becomes the  degree of imposi- 
tion. 
The common pattern emerging from our correction of the detractors' aim 
concerns the variable conditions of policy formation, pertaining especially 
to critical oversight, hierarchy, and imposition. Too little criticism and too 
much hierarchy and imposition tempt failure. These three dimensions con- 
verge on a single quality, which may be termed "openness." Critical over- 
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sight involves openness to  challenge and counterargument; hierarchy 
stands condemned to the  extent of its distortion of information channels; 
and imposition means a refusal to countenance weaknesses of a policy. The 
integrating idea of openness in policy formation will now be developed in 
our continued quest for the elusive "difference that  really makes a dif- 
ference" in policy design. 
THE CONDITIONS OF POLICY FORMATION 
How does openness relate to policy design? Designed public policies re- 
quire the backing of both empirical and normative theory. Empirical theory 
concerns the effects of policy, normative theory the worth of such effects 
and the processes through which they are produced (in terms of interests 
and values met, violated, promoted, obstructed, or ignored). Policy debates, 
and hence policy design, involve communication about both kinds of theory, 
which can vary in its degree of openness. Debate is "closed" to the extent 
of suppression of criticism, the  extension of hierarchy,and imposition of a 
policy or design scheme on a reluctant community. We will argue that  a 
focus on the openness of discourse in both empirical and normative dimen- 
sions is necessary, that  closure on either dimension is perilous, and that  
closure on both simultaneously can prove disastrous. 
Figure 1 represents diagrammatically our observation that  policy com- 
munication has normative and empirical dimensions, both of which can vary 
from open to closed. Dichotomizing these two dimensions gives us  four 
cells. Cell A may be termed "closed society," ceIl B "open society," cell C 
"good intentions," and cell D "practical reason." The reasons for these labels 
will become apparent in the discussion that follows. 
Communication over Empirical Claims 
Communication over 
Normative Claims 
Closed Open 
Closed A B 
Open C D 
Figure 1 
CLOSED SOCIETY 
Given the  thrust of our argument so far, it should immediately be ob- 
vious that  cell A risks policy disaster. Occasionally, temporarily-closed com- 
munication may be justifiable, perhaps in some cases of foreign policy crisis 
decision making. Even here, however, a case can be made for unconstrained 
communication within a closed policy-making group (George, 1972). More 
generally, the inevitably weak and uncorroborated empirical theory inform- 
ing policy design will yield unanticipated and unwanted consequences. In 
the first instance any such errors are likely to be suppressed rather than 
exposed and corrected. Moreover, to the degree intended consequences are 
achieved they will upset the actors or interests excluded from policy debate, 
causing subversion of and opposition to the policy in question. 
Paradoxically, cell A is where the control of any would-be elite of policy 
engineers seems to  be strongest. Those regarding policy design as  a tech- 
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nical ra ther  than a political matter would be happy with this location. 
Clearly, much policy analysis methodology, especially what Dunn (1981) 
calls "analycentric" methods and techniques, are cast in this image.3 But if 
our characterization of cell A is correct, this situation is exactly what policy 
designers should avoid. Consider two examples. 
First, this style of policy formation characterizes several Latin American 
cases in which authoritarian governments have faced little in the way of 
critical debate over their efforts to put economic theory into political prac- 
tice. O'Donnell (1973) coined the term "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" to 
characterize regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay that  coupled 
narrowly technocratic policy style with military coercion. In recent years, 
t he  policymakers of such regimes have been steeped in neoclassical 
economic theory at  U.S. universities, where they developed a dogmatic view 
of how an economy and policy system ought to  be organized. Upon being 
let loose on their own economies they could engage in "experiments in radi- 
cal conservative economics" (Foxley, 1983) to further their visions. 
The case of Chile is instructive, but by no means unique. The Pinochet 
regime emerging from the  1973, coup which toppled Allende's government, 
embarked on an  ambitious reorganization of the Chilean economy, osten- 
sibly to fight inflation and roll back socialism. This economic overhaul has 
involved austere stabilization measures, such as  substantial cuts in social 
welfare programs and rigid control of the money supply. The shared ideol- 
ogy of regime policymakers quelled debate over the empirical validity of 
monetarist economic theory. And a well-armed, active s ta te  police has 
stifled the citizenry's criticisms of the normative aims and consequences of 
economic policies. Turning to the Northern hemisphere, in recent years 
the United Kingdom has experienced a government uncritically committed 
to a particular economic theory, payinglittle heed to criticisms of the theory 
itself, evidence about its effects, the  ends i t  is intended to serve, and the 
side-effects of pursuit of these ends (see Prior, 1986, for an insider's ac- 
count). As  unemployment mounted and economic growth moved into 
reverse, the guardians of the policy congratulated themselves on a shrink- 
ing public sector borrowing requirement in a style reminiscent of what 
Jan is  (1972) calls " g r o ~ p t h i n k . " ~  Although defenders of t h e  British 
monetarist experiment can always plead that  the long term will justifies 
the strategy or that  short-term difficulties were a result of factors outside 
government's control, such as  global recession, Britain's economic perfor- 
mance since 1979 has been dismal even by its own post-1945 standards. I t  
is not the  economic theory's veracity, falsity, or even macrolevel ambitions 
at  issue here, but rather the immunity to criticism of the process and 
policies i t  inspires, their intentions, and the theory itself. Of course, the 
theory has  been attacked from outside governing circles, and gently 
criticized within Thatcher's cabinet. But this critical discussion has been 
divorced from policy formation. 
Possibilities for salvaging cell Amight be sought in the adoption of strong 
moral restraints by policymakers, perhaps along the lines of the stringent 
ethical code commended to  would-be "policy scientists" by Harold Lasswell 
(see, for  example, Lasswell, 1965a, p. 14). This strategy might work if em- 
pirical and normative knowledge about complex policy problems could be 
centralized in the hands of a few. We concur with the  arguments of Popper 
and von Hayek discussed above in commending suspicion of any such 
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centralization, regardless of t he  credentials and intentions of the  in- 
dividuals involved. 
Though we shall partially rehabilitate i t  below, cell A in our scheme 
promises some rather blatant shortcomings. Cells B and C have more in- 
sidious implications. 
OPEN SOCIETY 
Cell B constitutes the preferred location of Popperian enthusiasts of free 
criticism of policies and the theories informing them. To liberals and open 
society advocates alike, all value positions are  of equal validity--except, of 
course, for the values of free expression intrinsic to the very idea of an open 
society. Differences among nonnative positions are seen as ultimately ir- 
r e d ~ c i b l e . ~  The normative dimension of communication is closed. 
Policy design under such conditions can only involve pursuit of essential- 
ly arbitrary ends (even if there  is a “negative utilitarian” consensus on these 
ends). The effective pursuit of arbitrary ends raises Weber’s specter of tri- 
umphant zweckrationalitat. This recognition of the dangers of instrumen- 
tal rationalization of social and political life has been echoed over the years 
by Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), Tribe (1973), and Habermas (1984). 
Tribe’s statement of the  point is perhaps most accessible. Our purported- 
ly instrumental collective choices, Tribe claims, also shape our future 
preferences and ends, and hence our future selves. A drastic manifestation 
of this process may be found in policy choices about genetic engineering, 
which will affect who we become biologically. Less extreme examples are 
numerous. Decisions about resources to be devoted to different kinds of 
education shape the preferences and personalities of the individuals ex- 
periencing that  education. Policy informed by market values is itself like- 
ly to promote both adoption of such values on the  part of individuals who 
realize they have become increasingly functional for personal betterment 
(or necessary to avert poverty), and a reaction against market morality by 
those averse to competitive struggle. 
Habermas states a similar point slightIy differently. His principal fear 
is the ”colonization” of all human social life by the imperatives of instrumen- 
tal rationality, the net result of which is a world devoid of meaning, in which 
the only justification for social practices is their functional contribution to 
the maintenance of the social system. The most physically obvious example 
of such a process in action is perhaps urban redevelopment policy in recent 
decades, in which only the  rebellion of their residents has prevented cities 
from becoming instrumentally rationalized systems set in concrete and 
glass. The net result of t he  victory of instrumental rationality is the  same 
for Tribe and Habermas: society and polity lose control of their destiny, as  
they cast themselves adrift on a sequence of instrumental choices whose ul- 
timate destination cannot be predicted or controlled. Consider, for ex- 
ample, the tide of events set in motion by series of limited instrumental 
choices about nuclear weaponry. 
GOOD INTENTIONS 
If cell B in our diagram represents the hazards of excessive concentra- 
tion on the instrumental and empirical side of social problem solving and 
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policy design, cell C constitutes a different peril: exclusive focus on the nor- 
mative aspect. In cell C, open normative communication enables free dis- 
cussion about elements of the  right and good life, both individual and 
collective. Such discussion might even produce a measure of social agree- 
ment, of the sort that  forged the "collectivist consensus" in wartime Britain, 
which in turn laid the  normative foundations for the subsequent develop- 
ment of the  British welfare state.6 This kind of discursive collective life is 
presented in the works of Arendt (1958) and Habermas (1984). To Haber- 
mas, the "communicative action" of social life is properly oriented toward 
reciprocal t rust  and understanding among individuals, and certainly not 
toward instrumentally solving social problems; his (hypothetical) "ideal 
speech situation" should produce consensus on normative principals of jus- 
tice. The idea that  politics is properly a communicative domain, not a 
problem-solving one, is still more emphatic to Arendt. 
To Habermas, then, political discourse should be primarily, if not ex- 
clusively, about the  ends of action. Most of the time Habermas simply 
neglects any empirical dimension. Occasionally, though, he explicitly com- 
mends its repudiation, on the  grounds that the use of instrumental action, 
even in pursuit of ends produced by free discussion, involves consorting 
with "diabolical powers" (see Keane, 1984, p. 184-186). Such powers include 
those that  subverted the  ends of Marxism through the (instrumental) 
means of Leninist centralism. 
Popper and von Hayek would claim that  cell C is indeed the  road to hell, 
or to  a t  least serfdom, paved as it is with good intentions. Both note that  
most over-ambitious social reformers are well-meaning. Occasionally, such 
reformers may even gain near-universal consensus on the desirability of 
their project. Such was the case over the 1940s vision of a British welfare 
state. But any neglect of the empirical dimension means that  inevitable er- 
rors in a project or i ts  execution will not be anticipated or uncovered. As 
their schemes go awry, the guardians of the project may be tempted to take 
actions that  will further obstruct its fruition, such as  coercion, or the iden- 
tification and repression of scapegoats. The pursuit of the  widely-held goal 
of racial desegregation through means of court-ordered busing in the 
United States is indicative of the possibilities here. Busing provoked op- 
position even from those who shared the goal of desegregation. 
PRACTICAL REASON 
Cells A, B, and C in our scheme are all hazardous locations for policy 
design. I t  should come as  no surprise that  we believe cell D is safer. In a 
sense, cell D's free empirical and normative dialogue is a rehabilitation of 
the notion of politics as prudential practical reason. Such reason is about 
"what should be done" in both the  empirical sense of how to achieve goals, 
and the normative sense of the composition of these goals and the bounds 
on permissible means. The empirical aspect need not take the form of 
causal, law-like structures. Instead, this dimension is open to the pos- 
sibility of social reality itself changing as  a result of discursive deliberations 
engaged in by the  citizens constituting that  reality. 
The situation we have described may sound like a resurrection of the  
Athenianpolis; but what are its implications for policy design? The answer 
may be that  effective policy design requires that the objects of design par- 
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ticipate in the design process (see Dryzek, 1982), such that  the  conjectures 
of professional designers require validation from a broader public. Policy 
design therefore differs from architectural and engineering design in being 
a discursive rather than a manipulative process. In this light, policy design 
is inevitably political, for concerned stakeholders as well as  policy analysts 
can make and challenge claims. Thus politics and analysis are integrated, 
but not in the sense of analysis serving the political powers that  be. The 
task of the  policy analyst is to provide critical contributions to policy dis- 
course, rather than engineer and effect policies a t  the behest of the power- 
ful. 
Where might such arrangements be located (or a t  least sought)? Intima- 
tions are more numerous than exemplars. One such intimation may be 
found in the area of international conflict resolution, which has seen a 
recent vogue for "problem solving" exercises (see, for example, Fisher, 
1983). Participants (for example, British and Argentinean parliamen- 
tarians concerned with the Falklands conflict) scrutinize the nature and 
roots of their differences in a search for paths to  reconciliation that  satisfy 
the underlying interests of all sides. 
Discursive procedures have also made some appearances in domestic 
policy making, especially in the United States, generally under titles such 
as mediation and regulatory negotiation (Amy, 1983; Harter, 1982). Typi- 
cally, parties to a dispute reason through their differences under the 
auspices of a neutral third party in order to produce an action-oriented con- 
sensus. This consensus can then be expressed in public policy, though of 
course responsible institutions such as regulatory agencies, courts, and 
legislatures have the final say in the political system as  i t  stands. Expres- 
sion of consensus in policy is therefore facilitated if the forum is in some 
way tied to these institutions. Some well-publicized failures (e.g., the  Na- 
tional Coal Policy Project of the late 1970s) have occurred in the  absence of 
such a connection. Many of these exercises have appeared in the area of en- 
vironmental policy, and have involved citizen groups, environmentalists, 
local governments, industry, and s ta te  and federal agencies. The issues 
negotiated have ranged from pollution control systems to flood control 
schemes to mining operations. Mediation and regulatory negotiation have 
some affinity with the "principled negotiation" exercises sponsored by the 
Harvard Negotiation Project whose canons are laid out in Fisher and Ury 
(1981). 
These kinds of negotiations are  transient and issue-specific, yet the prin- 
ciples involved can apply irrespective of the policy issue a t  hand. Taken to 
heart, their spirit would suggest restructuring policy processes. However, 
given that  each exercise lasts only as  long a s  the problem at  which i t  is 
directed, there is no blueprint for permanent institutions implicit in them. 
Yet their successful functioning would undermine the credibility of exist- 
ing institutional arrangements such a s  bureaucratic hierarchy or  adver- 
sarial legal systems. 
Two further caveats should be entered concerning these exercises. First, 
they have generally focused on dispute resolution, rather than design per 
se. But resolution often requires the  creative design of patterns of action 
acceptable to the disputants. Second, these exercises in practice can in- 
volve deception and co-optation on the part of powerful interests such as 
developers. Thus the formal shell of a discursive exercise does not guaran- 
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tee free discourse among equals. The potential of mediation and similar 
procedures is thoroughly ambiguous. Indeed, many of their sponsors are 
unaware of the  discursive aspect of their potential, and seek conflict resolu- 
tion at  any price. 
This ambiguity points to two crucial roles for the policy analyst. The 
first is to  address the  conditions of discourse in a forum, in order to deter- 
mine whether canons of openness are  met. The second stems from the re- 
quirement that  all participants possess roughly equal capability to  present 
and question arguments, such that  those unduly rich in finance and infor- 
mation do not dominate the  proceedings. Equality here can be promoted 
by access to information (and perhaps funding); but political education of 
the resource-poor may also be necessary. The policy analyst might help, if 
only by disseminating information, questioning premises, and directing at- 
tention (cf. Forester, 1981).7 
Our dramatization of the need for free and open communication about 
matters both empirical and normative should not blind us to the fact that  
criticism in policy debate can be an ambiguous good. In the context of small- 
group decision making, i t  has long been noted that creative solutions to 
problems can be devastated by premature criticism. Incubation of ideas 
may be necessary if they are to be given a fair competitive chance. Thus 
our endorsement of open-policy communication should be qualified by a 
recognition tha t  infant ideas about the content of policies and designs may 
need protection from scrutiny (see Dryzek, 1983, p. 358). It is noteworthy 
that  mediators often feel i t  necessary to hold meetings behind closed doors, 
so that  the parties to a dispute can explore the implications of novel and 
creative solutions without fear of loss of face if the  proposal eventually 
proves unacceptable. But just as  successful mediation must quickly open 
itself up to the scrutiny of all interested parties, so must incubated public 
policy designs a t  some point be exposed to  public scrutiny on both norma- 
tive and empirical dimensions. Cell A in our scheme is a hazardous location, 
and should be vacated a s  soon as  possible. 
CONCLUSION 
Like any ideal, openness in policy communication functions as a stand- 
ard for the evaluation and criticism of existing practices and the design of 
new ones. To the extent openness is violated, designed policy can expect to 
err. To the extent this standard is met, policy designers should not shrink 
from ambitious schemes for the resolution of social problems. 
Although we have no cookbook recipe for attaining openness, we do have 
some modest suggestions for its pursuit in political institutions and policy 
analysis. Further experiments in extending mediation and like procedures 
in open directions would yield valuable evidence about the  possibilities for 
this kind of policy design. For their part, policy analysts could in a "meta" 
role, attend to the openness of design processes, and more immediately, en- 
hance and equalize the competence of participants in policy communication. 
NOTES 
lBut note that  truly complex problems may resist such decomposition 
(see Alexander, 1965). 
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2Haefele (1973) argues that  public choice theorists should expect their 
appropriate-size governments to produce bet ter  results (in utilitarian 
terms) only if they function by representation and vote ra ther  than  
bureaucracy. 
3The description "analycentric" means that  a policy claim is justified 
through reference to the methodological competence of its production, nor- 
mally through techniques such as  cost benefit analysis, systems analysis, 
linear programming, and decision analysis. 
4Prime Minister Thatcher's tendency to  restrict her circle of advisors to  
a small group of like-minded individuals and to dispense with potentially 
critical ministers has been widely noted. 
5This irreducibility does not mean that  values are arbitrary. Popperians 
recognize that  value systems have a history that  can be understood as  a suc- 
cession of critical contributions. But this history is independent of any 
policy problem at  hand, and hence it leaves us with an irreducible plurality 
in any given case. 
6A clear statement of the normative principles involved may be found in 
Beveridge (1 942). 
7More extensive discussion of the  institutionalization of principles of 
free discourse may be found in Dryzek (1987, part 111). 
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